Tuesday, February 21, 2006

Govind Shah: Social Inclusion Of Madheshi Community In Nation Building





SOCIAL INCLUSION OF MADHESHI COMMUNITY IN NATION BUILDING

Shree Govind Shah, Ph.D.
Ecologist and Policy Analyst
8 February 2006

This paper was presented at the Civil Society Forum Workshop for Research Programme on Social Inclusion and Nation Building in Nepal Organised by SNV on 13 February 2006, Kathmandu, Nepal

1. INTRODUCTION

The Madheshi community, in spite of having a long history of origin and habitat within the present day Nepal, is practically considered outsiders and they have been mostly marginalized and face exclusion in active political participation, administration and governance, decision-making and policy planning, and moreover, they face serious humanitarian problem i.e. of their true identity in their own native land. The Madheshi people feel highly discriminated and has almost lost ‘the sense of belongingness to this nation’. Since the early 1990s, Madheshi people have organized community groups and formed societies or organizations for the cause of Madheshi community. The issues of Madhesh and Madheshi community have been time and again raised by Jha (1997), Lawoti (2001), Shah (2002) Yadav (2003), Gupta (2004) and few others. Most of the Madheshi people feel that the entire Madhesh region and its inhabitants do not practically exist in Nepal’s consciousness and certainly in the consciousness of most of the donor community and much of the outside world. Lawoti (2001) reported a very low level of Madheshi people (11.2%) in the integrated index of governance with none in culture, academic and professional leadership.

The exclusion of Madheshi community from the national mainstream, which shares 32% of the country’s total human resources, has been the negative factor for the sound economic development in the country. Moreover, the spirit of harmonious partnership between the two groups of Pahadi and Madheshi community has never been developed. Socio-political and economic inclusion of Madhesh, initially considered as ‘bread basket’ and the major source of revenue generation, and the Madheshi people is what the country needs for building a more inclusive nation based on democratic norms and processes. This paper analyses the current status of Madhesh and Madheshi community, the emerging socio-political and economic issues, and recommends relevant research agenda on the issues of social inclusion and nation building. All the issues discussed here are data based; there are many minor issues talked very often but data and information related to those issues are not available.

2. TARAI REGION

2.1 Tarai Districts

The term Tarai is of recent origin describing the plain areas on the southern side of Siwalik range in South Asia. Tarai region, situated in the Outer Himalayan Zone, has been created by orogenic activity as well as by alluvial action in the Siwaliks and the Himalayan ranges (Spate and Learmonth, 1967). It has unique ecological features having tropical to subtropical climatic conditions. In Nepal, Tarai is geographically divided into ‘Outer Tarai’ and ‘Inner Tarai’, the later is also called ‘Vitri Madhes’ – the low lying river valleys north of Siwaliks.

In 1963, government established 75 districts in the country and the previously 17 districts in Tarai were restructured into 20 districts which also included part of Siwalik range and hills. District demarcation was not based on ecological or social basis, which could have then included only the outer Tarai and Vitri Madhesh area. All the Tarai districts have varying proportion of Siwalik and mid mountain areas, the highest being 77.5% in Nawalparasi district, 51.5% in Chitwan district, 50.8 % in Banke district and 41% in Kailali district to the lowest 8.9% in Sunsari district and about 7% in Jhapa district; the average being 32.4% for the 20 districts.

It appears that the well calculated government decision including part of hills in Tarai district aimed at gradually increasing the dominance of hill people and their distinctive culture, practices, language and architectural style of the hill region in the plains. Gaige (1975) reported the hill culture and more flexible social traditions and practices penetrating the plain region where the people practiced vegetarianism, observing dietary restrictions and considering inter-caste marriage as social taboo. The inclusion of hill areas in Tarai districts increased the number of hill people in the district reducing chances of plain people to play decisive role in political arena and the governance system in their own area. It also made the holistic planning very difficult for the Tarai districts, which since 1963 are ecologically heterogeneous.

2.2 Area and Population

The total land area in the 20 Tarai districts is 34,109 sq km which accounts for 23.1% of the country’s total land area (Table 1). In 2001, 48.4% of the country’s total population of 23.2 million lived in Tarai districts with a density of 329 persons/sq km. Tarai plain and Vitri Madhesh together covers 15.6% of the country’s total area.

Table 1 Land Area in 20 Tarai Districts

Ecological area Sq km Percentage (%) of Nepal
Mid mountain and Siwalik 11,041 34.2
Tarai plain including Vitri Madhesh 23,068 67.6
Total 34,109 100 23.1
Source: ISRSC (2004)
Note: Population for Nepal in 2001 was 23.151 million and 11.212 million for Tarai districts.
Country’s total area is 147,484 sq km.

3. MADHESH AND MADHESHI

3.1 Madhesh

The term Madhes implies to the Gangetic plain and the Vitri Madhesh area bordering India on the southern side and spreading north up to the foothill of Siwalik range. The word Madhesh is derived from Sanskrit word ‘Madhyadesh’ which extends from the foothill of the Himalayan region in the north to the Vidhyachal Parbat (mountain) in the south situated in central India. Though the terms Madhesh and Tarai are used synonymously, it is important to note that Madhesh does not cover all parts of Tarai districts; it excludes Siwalik and mid mountain areas. Madhesh is a well defined ecological region, which is approximately 885 km long from its western boundary, the Mahakali River, to its eastern boundary, the Mechi River while its average width along its entire east-west axis is only 26 km varying from 4 km to 52 km.

3.2 Madheshi

Madheshis are the non-hill origin people living in Madhesh region. The Madheshi community is composed of the traditional Hindu caste hierarchy such as Brahmin, Kshatriya, Baisya and Dalits, and indigenous Janjati ethnic groups, other native tribes and Muslims. Gaige (1975) used the terms ‘hill people’ and ‘plains people’ living in Tarai districts, and defined a) “plains people are those who speak plains languages as their mother tongues or first language, whether they were born or live in the plains or hills”; the plains languages being Maithili, Bjojpuri, Awadhi, Urdu, Hindi and Bengali, and dialects of these languages used by Janjati groups, and b) “hill people whose mother tongue or first language is one that predominates in the hill region of Nepal such as Nepali, Newari, Magar, Gurung, Rai and others. Sociologically, hill people belong to Hindu caste groups, hill Janjati groups and Newars. The hill people are also called ‘Pahadi’ or ‘Pahadiya’. Dahal (1996) divided Madheshi community into four groups a) Indigenous Janjati ethnic people living in Madhesh for generations, b) people belonging to traditional Hindu caste hierarchy, c) businessmen of Indian origin e.g. Marwadi, Sikh and others, and d) Muslims.

3.3 Historical Background

Madhesh has a long historical background dating back to the kingdom of Videha or Mithila established in eastern to central Madhesh and a part of the present day north Bihar, India (Malangia, 1997). In the mid western Madhesh, Shakya kings ruled in 600 BC, the Buddha belonging to the Shakya dynasty was born in 563 BC. Similarly, kingdoms were established in Simraun Garh in the present day Bara district. In Madhesh, several kingdoms were established and ruled by many dynasties (Thakur, 1956), which all perished with time and were abandoned and the land converted into forests. Gaige (1975) concluded: “the ancient and medieval history of this region is a cyclic one in which men and forests have dominated in terms”. Many ruins which are still to be identified and properly studied would tell the ancient history of this region. The history of Kathmandu Valley and some hill regions have been studied and reported by Pahadi scholars and historians in much detail while they ignored Madhesh region. Again, there are very few Madheshi historians and scholars who due to lack of resources have not yet studied in detail the complex ancient history of Madhesh. In recent decades, Lumbini area in Madhesh, the birth place of Buddh, received worldwide recognition and support for meaningful excavation, detail study and renovation of key sites.

The Madhesh region was annexed to Nepal during the Nepal unification period beginning the mid 1770s by Prithivi Naarayan Shah, however, much of the ancient Madhesh areas ruled by various kings and principalities for centuries are now in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh states of India. Again, the Anglo-Nepalese war between 1814 and 1816, and the resulting Treaty of Sugauli and subsequent treaties with British India reduced the Madhesh region. The outer Madhesh areas south of Dang and Chitwan valleys are under the Indian territory.

3.4 Migration and Population Distribution in Madhesh

Migration in Hills

The historical evidences indicate that most of the hill people excluding the indigenous ethnic groups migrated from various parts of India (Bista, 1967). During the Muslim invasions of the 12th-14th centuries in India, the Kshatriyas and Brahmins migrated to the mountain regions of the present day western Nepal and they established principalities in hills. They accommodated some aspects of hill tribe culture to their owns and developed the hill culture of to-day. Around the 12th century, there was eastward migration of people speaking a Sanskrit-based language – which later on developed as Nepali language (Clark, 1963). Comparatively inhospitable and resource poor western hills, and gradual overpopulation and agriculture deterioration pushed the hill people, both the migrants and the indigenous people, to eastern hills up to Darjeeling areas and Sikkim in India, which were less densely populated and were wetter (Gaige, 1975). This could be the reason of accepting speakers of Nepali and hill tribal languages from Darjeeling, Sikkim and nearby areas as ethnic Nepalese, who largely enjoy both the Indian and Nepali citizenship.

Migration to Madhesh

Between 1860s and 1951, government encouraged and made efforts to vertical migration of hill people in Madhesh region. The response was not much favourable due to the alien climatic conditions in Madhesh to hill people (Paudel, 1980). There were settlements in Madhesh region south from the dense forest area and Vitri Madhesh was inhabitated by indigenous Janjati people. As land, water and forest resources were abundant in Madhesh, people from the densely populated Indian districts bordering Madhesh region having similar cultures, tradition, practices and languages migrated to various parts of Madhesh between mid 19th and the mid 20th century.

Overpopulation, agriculture and economic deterioration, natural calamities resulting famine and many other reasons pushed the hill people of both Hindu castes and indigenous Janjati groups to out-migrate in Madhesh region. Better economic opportunities, abundant land and forest resources and the malaria eradication programme launched by the State encouraged involuntary migration into Madhesh (. People migrated mostly to northern Madhesh region and Vitri Madhesh areas, which were forested and had smaller settlements; large areas of forests were cleared for farming and settlements, which gradually reduced access to forest resources for Madheshi people. Hill people established settlements and farming areas along East-West Highway under construction. Very few hill people migrated to already established towns such as Janakpur and practically none to the large Madhesh settlements.

Table 2 Linguistic Characteristics of Population in Madhesh Districts

People speaking languages % of population in 1961 1/ % of population in 1981 2/
Eastern Mid western Far western Eastern Mid western Far western
Hill languages 2.1- 24.5 1.2 - 6.3 3.2 – 5.8 12.1- 86.2 28.9- 66.3 46.1- 80.7
Plains languages 75.5- 97.9 93.7- 97.8 94.2 – 96.8 13.8 – 87.9 33.7 – 71.1 19.3- 53.9
Source: 1/ Census of Nepal, 1961 (as cited by Gaige, 1975)
2/ Census of Nepal, 1981
NOTE: In 1963, Madhesh districts were restructured and their number increased from 17 to 20; pars of Siwaliks and mid mountains were included in Madhesh districts.

The linguistic characteristics of population in Madhesh districts significantly changed between 1961 and 1981 due to influx of hill population in Madhesh as well as inclusion of some parts of Siwaliks and mid mountains to Madhesh districts. This marginalized the population speaking plains languages. This resulted in dominance of hill culture, tradition, practices and languages in Madhesh region particularly in Jhapa, Chitwan, Dang and Kanchanpur districts where about 67% to 85% of the district’s total population consist of hill linguistic groups. The current trend of changing cultural equation indicates that in two to three decades time most of Chitwan, Jhapa, Kanchanpur, Dang, Nawalparasi, Kailali, and Morang districts, half and more of Sunsari, Rupendehi, Banke and Bardia, and the northern third of Sarlahi, Bara, Parsa and Rauthat districts the plains culture, tradition and practices would gradually reduce.

Population Distribution of Madheshi Community in 2001 (% of total population) is as follows:

Low 15.3 - 47.5% Chitwan, Jhapa, Kanchanpur, Dang, Nawalparasi, Kailali and Morang (7)
Medium 58.7 – 61.3 Sunsari, Rupandehi, Banke and Bardia (4)
High 77.5-93.5 8 districts between Koshi and Narayani rivers, and Kapilbastu
According to 1952/54 population census, only about 6% of the population in Madhesh districts was of hill origin and the rest 94% population was composed of Madheshis of Hindu caste hierarchy, indigenous Janjati groups, Muslims and other tribes. The population dynamics significantly changed in 1981 increasing the percentage of hill people from about 6% in 1952 to 43% in 1981. The Pahadi population increased many fold from merely 142,000 in 1952 to 4.1 million in 2001 while the Madheshi population increased just over two fold from 2.5 million to 5.3 million over the last 50 years (Table 3).

Table 3 Changes in Madheshi and Pahadi Population
(Population in ‘000)
Year Highland group Lowland group Total % of lowland group
1952/54 142 2,246 2,388 94.1
1981 2,795 3,762 6,557 57.4
1991 3,444 5,262 8,706 60.4
2001 4,120 7,092 11,212 63.3
Source: Gurung, H. (1998). Social Demography and Expressions, Kathmandu, Nepal, 1998
CBS (2001). Population Census.
Highland people = people of hill origin; Lowland people = people of plains, Madheshi

3.5 Madheshi Community in Nepal

The 59 castes and ethnic nationalities identified in 2001 census are broadly grouped into Hindu caste hierarchy, Indigenous Janjati and Muslims and their population both in 20 Tarai districts and in other remaining 55 districts are given in Table 4.

Baisya, Yadav and other Hindu caste group share 44.3% of the total Madheshi population followed by Indigenous Janjati (27.5%), Muslims (13.2%) and Dalits (11.9%). Indigenous Janjati, Dalits and Muslims are socio-economically more disadvantaged compared to other Hindu castes. Brahmin, Kshatriya and Kayastha are in minority but they are relatively well-educated, resource rich and more aggressive in politics, governance and in leadership role.
Table 4 Madheshi Community in Nepal

Madheshi Community Population in ‘000 Nepal % of Nepal
Tarai districts Remaining districts
Hindu caste hierarchy
Brahmin/Kshtriya/Kayastha 215.7 13.3 229.0 3.1
Baisya, Yadav and others 3,126.6 168.9 3,295.5 44.3
Dalits 874.1 12.7 886.8 11.9
Indigenous Janjati 1,940.1 106.4 2,046.5 27.5
Muslim 935.5 41.7 972.3 13.2
Total 7,092 343 7,435 100
Source: CBS (2001)

Madheshi community tends to be less migratory in nature compared to hill people and they prefer to remain closely in their traditional settlements. This reduces their chances of integrating with new socio-economic environment as well as with other communities. In general, 95.4% of the Madheshi people live in Madhesh region while the remaining 4.6% live in hills and mountains. Whereas, about 18% of the hill people live in Madhesh region and they out-migrate more easily from their settlements. The hill Brahmins, Chhetris and Newars are well-educated, resource rich, more land and capital and they have achieved leadership dominance not only in their settlements or regions but also in Madhesh region.

4. RESOURCE USE AND MANAGEMENT

Most of the data and information available on natural resources such as land, forests, productivity and production, economic activities and general economics are given at district level. The data available for Madhesh region is briefly described here.

Table 5. Agriculture Land and Forests in 20 Tarai Districts

Area Tarai districts Madhesh region Hilly region
Total area in Tarai districts 3,411 2,307 1,104
Arable land 1,414 1,234 180
Forest land 1,364 486 878
% of arable land 41.5 53.5 16.3
% of forest land 40.0 21.1 79.5
Source: ISRSC (2004)

The 20 Tarai districts have in total 1.414 million ha of arable land; 87.3% of the total arable land is in Madhesh region and the remaining 12.7% in hills (Table 5). Arable land covers 53.5% of the Madhesh region while only about 16% of hills in the Tarai districts are cultivated. This unbalanced arable land distribution could exert more pressure on Madhesh region for farmland resources.

Although the irrigation facility developed in the last 100 years or so cover about 62% of the total farmland but due to various technical and management problems only about 46% of the total farmland is actually irrigated at least during wet season (Shah and Singh, 2001). It has been estimated that only about 22% of the farmland is irrigated during winter months and just below 5% in spring. Multiple cropping and commercial crops would require water throughout the whole growing season. This would put barrier to economic development of Madhesh people whose economic activities are mainly agriculture based.

There is unbalanced forest distribution in Madhesh region; only about 21% of the Madhesh region is forested compared to about 80% in hilly areas of the 20 Tarai districts (Table 5). People in Madhesh region has very little access to forest resources, and again, a large chunk of the forests are located in national parks and wildlife reserves.

5. EXCLUSION OF MADHESH AND MADHESHI COMMUNITY

Nepal has become to a greater extent an unequal society in which some people or community and geographical area have prospered while many other communities and districts have not. There is strong conceptual debate around the notions that exclusion either social, economic, political or geographical have been the main causes of unequal society. Exclusion results in poverty, unequal distribution of resources and development initiatives, and inability of certain community or geographical area to participate in socio-economic and political development processes.

Social exclusion is defined as “the inability of our society to keep all groups and individuals within reach of what we expect as a society and the tendency to push vulnerable and difficult individuals in the least popular places”. Education, skills, social behaviour, social network and groups, social contact, welfare, health, child poverty and isolation and vulnerability are the key social exclusion indicators. Children living in poverty may enter a cycle of poor educational achievement, unmanageable behaviour, unemployment and homelessness.

Economic exclusion would primarily include unemployment, income, economic opportunity, social and support services such as health and drinking water and basic infrastructure. There is positive relation between social exclusion and economic exclusion; illiterate and poor individuals are even more excluded because their low ability to read and write prevents their adaptation, professional conversion and their social mobility (Layachi, 2001).

Political exclusion inhibits basic citizenship rights and when done on a large scale, it prevents communities and even geographical areas from participating in political arena, which inhibits democratic process. The key variables are basic citizenship rights, participation in political life, making public policies, decision-making process and representation.

5.1 Geographical Exclusion

In Nepal, there exist strong geographical inequalities in developing basic socio-economic infrastructures and facilities and providing development opportunity. In recent years, few researchers have linked the results of geographical exclusion such as wide spread poverty, inequality in resource distribution, increasing vulnerability and marginalizing the local inhabitants particularly in the mid-western and far-western region of Nepal with the Maoist insurgency (Nayak, 1998; Panday, 1999; Kumar, 2000; Upreti, 2002; and others).

There are examples of geographical disparity in other parts of the world e.g. Sri Lanka, Ireland, Bhutan and many other countries; in most of these countries the disparity is between the northern and the southern parts of the country. Tarai districts are located in the southern part of Nepal where 95.5% of the total Madheshi people (7.435 million) live. There are 20 districts in Tarai administrative area and 55 districts are located in hills and mountains where 82.2% of the Pahadi people live. Resource Endowment Ranking Index values are used to measure geographical disparity in the country.

a) Social Exclusion

Poverty

Worst poverty prevails in the Tarai districts. About 45% of the 20 Tarai districts have worst poverty rankings and only 25% are ranked as ‘best’ compared to 35% districts in hills and mountains are ranked as ‘best’ and 29% are ranked as ‘worst’. The Tarai districts having good access to transportation and marketing systems are also reported to have rich natural resources endowment rankings particularly the cultivated land (Table 6).

Table 6. Poverty and Natural Resources Ranking Index

(Number of Districts)
Index Ranking Group Poverty Ranking NR Ranking
Tarai districts H/M districts Tarai districts H/M districts
Ranking 1-25 Worst 9 16 0 25
Ranking 25-50 Intermediate 6 20 3 19
Ranking 51-75 Best 5 19 17 11
TOTAL 20 55 20 55
Source: Sharma and Shah (2002), ICIMOD (1997)

There appears to have ethnicity and poverty interaction. Rauthat, Siraha, Mahotari, Dhanusha and Sarlahi districts, where about 78-94% of the total population is Madhesi people, are ranked as having worst poverty cases; the poverty ranking index ranges from the lowest 4 in Rautahat to 13 in Sarlahi district. The poverty level is reported to be very low in Jhapa, Chitwan and Morang districts where majority of the people are of hill origin.

b) Education

About 90% of the Tarai districts have a large number of educationally deprived populations compared to only about 13% in hills and mountain districts (Table 7). Siraha, Bardia, Dhanusha, Mahotari, rauthat and Sarlahi have the largest number of educationally deprived people.

Fifty percent of the Tarai districts have ‘worst ranking’ for child literacy rates compared to 29$ in hills and mountain districts. Rauthat, Sarlahi and Mahotari are the worst in child literacy index values. Again, 40% of Tarai districts have lower overall literacy rates compared to 31% in hill districts.

Table 7. Educationally Deprived Population and Child Literacy Rates

(Number of Districts)
Index Ranking Group Educationally deprived population Child literacy rates
Tarai districts H/M districts Tarai districts H/M districts
Ranking 1-25 Worst 18 7 10 16
Ranking 25-50 Intermediate 1 25 7 17
Ranking 51-75 Best 1 23 3 22
TOTAL 20 55 20 55
Source: Sharma and Shah (2002)- New ERA, ICIMOD (1997)

b) Economic Exclusion

There is disparity in per capita budget allocation between Tarai and hill districts; 10 out of the 20 Tarai districts have ‘worst’ index values compared to about 17% of the hill districts. Similarly, more number of Tarai districts has lower primary sector development compared to hill districts (Table 8).

Table 8. Per Capita Budget Allocation and Primary Sector Development Index

(Number of Districts)
Index Ranking Group Per Capita budget allocation Primary sector development
Tarai districts H/M districts Tarai districts H/M districts
Ranking 1-25 Worst 10 9 8 16
Ranking 25-50 Intermediate 5 18 8 14
Ranking 51-75 Best 5 28 4 25
TOTAL 20 55 20 55
Source: Sharma and Shah (2002)- New ERA, ICIMOD (1997)

The data and information so far available indicate that the Tarai districts having higher proportion of Madheshi population have much lower socio-economic index values compared to districts where hill people are in dominance. However, there are no information and data available for comparing hill people and plains people living in the same district; the hill people generally live in the northern part of the district, along the highways and in growth centres whereas plains people mostly live in the rural areas with less accessibility to education, health and other development parameters.

Government and political organisations have been advocating and focusing poverty reduction programme mostly in the hills and mountains, and they have been advocating the donors that only the hills and mountains have large number of poor people. It appears that the politicians, policy makers, decision makers and national planners who are mostly of hill origin ignored the socio-economic development issues of Madhesh and the Madheshi community. The fact is that the Madheshi people are not in the right place and their voices are not heard or considered.

c) Political Exclusion

Electoral Constituencies

The average population per constituency is considerably higher in Tarai districts (127,414) than in the mountain (73,026) and 109,081 in the hill districts (Table 9). This reduces the number of parliamentarians representing Tarai region where about 96% of the country’s total Madheshi people live while increases their number from hills and mountains where 82% of the country’s total Pahadi people live.

Table 9. Political Constituency Delineation in Nepal

Mountain Hills Tarai Total
Districts 16 39 20 75
Population (‘000) 4,141 10,398 8,644 23,183
Constituencies 23 94 88 205
Population/Constituency 73,026 109,081 127,414 103,174
Population/Constituency Range 9,587 to 121,996 67,434 to 154,549 114,056 to 157,349
Source: District Demographic profile of Nepal, Informal Sector Research & Study Centre, 2002, Kathmandu, Nepal

5.2 Exclusion of Madheshi Community

About 96% of the Madheshi community lives in 20 Tarai districts and 15 of these districts have intermediate to worst poverty situation. Although there is no authentic data available, the general observation indicate that the Madheshi people living in traditional settlements in rural areas have nominal access to social infrastructure and facilities and, moreover, the induced economic opportunities are practically non-existent in their habitats. Many of the modern day basic facilities have not yet reached Madhesh villages.

Nearly 40% of the Madheshi population is Dalits and indigenous Janjati who are inherently disadvantaged in many social and economic aspects. Again, poverty is very high among the Muslim population living in rural areas; they have average low rate of literacy and their socio-economic development voices have reached nowhere; they share 13% of the total Madheshi population

In fact, the Madheshi community has never been fully integrated in the overall political, socio-economic and human resource development agenda of the country. They have been excluded from the national mainstream. There is widespread feeling among the Madheshi community that they have been strongly discriminated and are not given proper opportunity in the country. They lack proper share in development activities and are not represented in politics or decision-making processes. Education facilities and job opportunities either in government or international organisations functioning in the country are not easily available for Madheshi people. They are not allowed to work in military service and very few people work in police service.

a) Social Exclusion

Poverty

Poverty line in Nepal is currently estimated to be 31%. However, about 46% of Dalits, 41% of Muslims and 33% of indigenous Janjati population are below the poverty line (World Bank, 2006). Together these three major ethnic groups have 52.6% of the total Madheshi population. The rest 47.4% of the Madheshi people have lower poverty level. The above poverty data indicates that a large proportion of Madheshi households are excluded from the mainstream development. Poverty itself is the main factor of exclusion; the poor people could not afford basic education, primary health care, sanitation practices and decent housing.

Land Assets

Landlessness has become a major problem among Madheshi community. The recent report indicates a grave situation particularly in Dalit, Janjati and Muslim ethnic community; about 37% of Dalits, and 32% of Janjati households do not own agricultural land while 41% of Muslims are landless. About 79% of Mushar, a Dalit community, do not own land; they have the lowest literacy rate of 7.3%.

Education

About 79% Dalits, 68% Muslims, 54% indigenous Janjati and 42% mid caste population are illiterate. The female literacy is very low, below 11%, among Dalits and Muslim. A large Madheshi population has been excluded from basic education. Again, the level of education in rural Madhesh is of much lower grade.

b) Economic Exclusion

Employment

Three castes/ethnic groups namely Brahmins, Chhetri and Newars have dominated the civil service in the country. In 1991 these three castes constituted 36% of total population in Nepal but occupied 89.2 percent of position in civil service, while Madheshi community accounted for 32% of population but occupied only 8.4% of position in civil service (Table 10). This indicates that Madheshi people have highly discriminated in government services. It is interesting to note that in 1971 these three castes had occupied 89% of posts in civil services. Thus the pattern of civil service had not much changed over the past twenty years having these Brahmin, Chhetris and Newars dominating the civil service over the years and it is very unlikely that this trend will change in near future.

Table 10. Representation of different Caste/Ethnic groups in Civil Service

Caste/Ethnic Group % of Population in 1991 Share in Civil Service (in Percent)
1971* 1991**
Brahmins 12.9 32.0 41.3
Chhetri & Thakuri 17.6 21.0 14.7
Newar 5.6 36.0 33.2
Tarai (Madheshi) 32.0 7.0 8.4
Hill Social Group 22.4 4.0 2.4
Others 8.3
Source:
* Pashupati Rana’s Nepal’s Fourth Plan: A Critique. (Yeti Pocket Book Ltd 1971) pp 18-19
** D.N. Dhungel’s article “ The Nepalese Administrative System” in Contemporary Nepal .P.P. 122-123.

Manpower involved in International organisations in Nepal and projects implemented under these organisations is given in Table11. About 81% of the total manpower involved in the 30 multilateral agencies working in Nepal and 61 projects funded by these agencies are from Pahadi community, 14.1% are foreigners and the rest 5.2% are Madheshi people.

Table 11 Manpower Involved in International Organisations in Nepal

Organisations/ Agencies No. Manpower Ivolved, 2001
Foreigner Pahadi Madhesi Total
International (Multilateral) 30 121 (15.8%) 608 (79.2%) 38 (5.0%) 767
Projected implemented by Multilateral Agencies 61 21 (8.6%) 209 (85.3%) 15 (6.1%) 245
TOTAL 91 142 (14.1 %) 817 (80.7%) 53 (5.2%) 1,012
Source: UNDP (2001). Directory of the United Nations and Its related Specialized Agencies in Nepal, September 2001, UNDP, Kathmandu

Judiciary

Just over 8% of the total judges in the country are from Madheshi community, while the rest 92% are from Pahadi community (Table 12). Participation of judges from Madheshi community at the Appeal Court is about 13.0%, which could be considered a ‘high level of participation’ compared to 6.1% at the District Courts. The lower number of judges could probably be due to a) discrimination of Madheshi community to enter into the judiciary agencies, b) low number of law graduates from Madheshi community, and c) unwillingness to join the judiciary services for various reasons.

Table 12. Man Power Distribution in Judiciary, 2001

Type of Judiciary Pahadi Madhise Total % Madhise
Chief Justice & Supreme Court Justices 18 2 20 10.0
Chief Justices of Appeal Court 10 2 12 16.7
Judges of Appeal Court 64 9 73 12.3
Judges of District Court 123 8 131 6.1
First class officers in judicial services 18 0 18 0
TOTAL 233 21 254 8.3
Percentage 91.7 8.3
Source: HMG (2001). Nyaya Parishad Bulletin, Nyaya Parishad Secretariat, 18 December 2001 (3 Paush 1958)
Employment in Higher Posts

The Pahadi people particularly the Brahmins and Chhetris control most of the positions of power and influence the government, other governing institutions in their action. They consider Madheshi people as ‘non-Nepali’ or ‘less Nepali’ and the later gets excluded from a higher post unless a Madheshi person is in their high level of confidence. Table 13 shows a very low level of involvement of Madheshi people in constitutional bodies and in higher posts – these people make national policies, and are the key decision makers and policy implementers.

Table 13. Madheshi Representation in Cabinet, Constitutional Bodies and High Official Posts

Post and Organisations Posts Pahadi Madheshi % Madheshi
Ministers 24 21 4 16.7
Royal Standing Committee 8 7 1 12.5
Judges in Supreme Court 21 12 2 9.5
Chiefs of the Constitutional bodies 7 7 0 0
Members of Constitutional bodies 19 17 2 10.5
National Human Rights Commission 5 4 1 20.0
National Planning Commission 6 5 1 16.7
Ambassadors/Consulate Generals 23 22 1 4.3
Secretary/regional administrators 37 36 1 2.7
Vice-Chancellors 5 5 0 0
Vice-Chancellor RONAST, Royal Nepal Academy 2 2 0 0
Chief of Security forces 3 3 0 0
Dept. heads of HMG’ 47 43 4 8.5
Chief of Govt. Corporations and Committees 56 52 4 7.1
Chief of Govt. Information and Communication agencies 4 4 0 0
Heads of Parliamentary bodies & committees 15 12 3 20.0
Source: Singh, A. (2003) Restructuring of Nepali State: A Madheshi Perspective
Note: Number of Minister is of Girija Prasad Kiorala cabinet in 2001, all the other data are before October 2002.

c) Political Exclusion

In the two houses of parliament composed after the 1991 election, Brahmins held 38.1% of the seats and Newars 8.3%, the highest proportion in all four legislatures which were the products of adult franchise (Table 14). Similarly, they continued to retain their numbers even in the election of 1999 where Brahmins and Newars held 39.6% and 8.3% respectively. Brahmins, Chhetri and Newar dominated the seats in combined upper and lower houses of parliament constituting 65.2% of seats while they represent 36% of population. On the other hand, Madhesh community constituted only 17.4% of seats while representing 32.0% of population. Thus one finds a serious imbalance in the representation in our law-making body so called national legislature.

Table 14. Representation of Various Caste and Ethnic Groups in National Legislature
(In per cent)
Caste/Ethnic Groups National Legislature Population
1959 1981* 1991 1999 1991
Brahmins 27.5 13.3 38.1 39.6 12.9
Chhetri/Thakuri 31.2 36.3 18.2 17.3 17.6
Newar 3.7 8.1 8.3 8.3 5.6
Subtotal 62.4 57.7 64.6 65.2 36.1
Madheshi 22.0 18.5 19.6 17.4 32.0
Hill SocialGroups 15.6 23.0 14.7 14.7 22.4
Others — 0.7 1.2 1.5 8.3
Source: Pashupati Rana’s Article “The Evolution of Nepalese Nationalism” in Contemporary Nepal, pp 83
IIDS, The Fourth Parliamentary Election.
· Gurung, Harkha, The Sociology of Election in Nepal:1959-81, Asian Survey, Vol XXII, March 1982, p.313

The structure in the political parties is mostly centralized and is largely non-inclusive. Again, the major leaders in any political party are the hill Brahmins and Chhetris and normally they discriminate the Madheshi people in most actions. Central Committee of any political party is vital for formulating policies and the members make collective decision for important action. It appears that the Pahadi leaders do not have confidence over the Madheshi people and they tend to exclude the latter in policy formulation and decision-making jobs. Nepali Congress and the UML are the major democratic parties in the country but they have included only few Madheshi as members in their Central Committees (Table 15). They advocate the proportional representation but in action it does not happen.

Again, representation of Madheshi politicians in both Upper House and Lower House is considerably low (Table 16). This could greatly inhibit the democratization process in the country. The findings clearly indicate that Madheshi people are highly ignored and are under represented in the current political arena, which may, in long run, create vulnerable situation in the country.

Table 15. Central Committee Members in Major National Political Parties
Political Parties Total Pahadi Madheshi % Madheshi
Nepali Congress 38 35 3 7.9
Communist Party of Nepal (UML) 69 65 4 5.8
Nepali Congress Democratic 30 25 5 16.7
Jan Morcha Nepal 44 43 1 2.3
Source: Ahiraj (2006): Madhesh Vani, January 2006.

Table 16. Number of Madheshi Member of Parliament in 1999

Political Parties Total MPs Lower House Upper House
Lower House Upper House Pahadi Madheshi Pahadi Madheshi
Nepali Congress 113 24 90 23 21 3
Communist Party of Nepal (UML) 69 20 59 10 19 1
Rashtriya Prajatantra Party 11 5 7 4 5 0
Nepal Sadbhavna Party 5 1 1 4 0 1
Rashtriya Jana Morcha 5 0 5 0 0 0
Nepal Majdoor Kishan Party 1 0 1 0 0 0
United People’s Front 1 0 1 0 0 0
King’s Nominees 0 10 0 0 9 1
Total 205 60 164 41 54 6
% Madheshi 20.0 11.1
Source: Parliament Secretariat Records, Singha Durbar, Nepal, 1999.

Involvement of Madheshi People in Media
Both the government and private sector or non-government media sector have excluded Madheshi people from their management committee similar to the political parties (Table 17). Media seldom raises the socio-economic, development and political issues of Madhesh and Madheshi people positively. The voices and the grievances of the common Madheshi people unless they hold a major position are lost.

Table 17. Involvement of Madheshi people in Media

Total Pahadi Madheshi % Madheshi
A. Government Media: Management Committee
Press council 13 10 1
Radio Nepal 5 4 1
Gorakhapatra 5 5 0
Nepal Television 5 5 0
Rastriya Samachar Samiti 5 5 0
Subtotal 33 29 2 6.01
B. Non-government Media
Nepal Patrakar Federation 24 23 1
Press Chautari 21 21 0
Nepal Press Union 12 12 0
Press Group 23 22 1
SAAF Nepal 25 25 0
Nepal Environment Media Group 13 15 0
Federation of National News Media 13 12 1
Subtotal 131 128 3 2.3
Source: Ahiraj (2006): Madhesh Vani, January 2006.

6. EMERGING ISSUES OF MADHESHI COMMUNITY

Madheshi community in general has been marginalized and the people suffer from a combination of linked problems such as illiteracy, poverty, poor skills, unemployment in public sector and the average low incomes. Undoubtedly, there is affluent society in Madhesh community such as Brahmin, Kshatriya and Kayastha who are relatively educated, well off, prosperous and lead a comfortable life, but they are in minority in number – just 3.1% of the total Madheshi population. The majority of the population belonging to Dalits, Janjati, Muslims and other caste groups living in rural areas are facing acute hardship. Poor investment, unplanned management of already deteriorating land resources, poor socio-economic infrastructures and facilities and lack of socio-economic planning have adversely affected the majority of the Madheshi people.

There have been little efforts to prevent social, economic and political exclusion and to reintegrate those who have become excluded through unemployment, landlessness, homelessness and so on. The past discriminatory public policies and the general unhealthy attitudes of the hill people who are in governance towards the average Madheshi have been detrimental to national integration. Their problems have not been solved or rather ignored by the State. The major emerging social, economic and political issues which need immediate to short term action are briefly described here.

a) Social Issues

1. Identity and Recognition

Most of the Madheshi people are loosing their identity since they are treated as ‘less Nepali’ or ‘non-Nepali’ by Pahadi people. One of the main reasons could be attributed to their socio-cultural, linguistic and physical affinity with the communities living immediately on the other side of the border in India, which historically was a part of Madhesh. Culture, tradition, practices and language have great influence on ‘identity’ of a person e.g. a Nepali or hill language speaking person from Darjeeling or Sikkim, who have been living their for generations, is readily accepted in Nepal as a Nepali and he or she enjoys all the socio-political benefits. Whereas a Madheshi who does not speak Nepali or any other hill language and who does not follow hill tradition and practices is not easily accepted as Nepali by hill Nepalese.

2. Illiteracy and Poor Skills

There is mass illiteracy among the Dalits, Janjati, Muslims, and the other caste people living in villages. Female education is practically non-existent among many communities living outside the urban centres. The traditional society has very little changed in the last fifty years or so and doe to the non-migratory nature they have little interaction with other community. Again, the level and quality of secondary or higher secondary education in Madhesh region is quite inferior compared to education in hill areas. Consequently, the Madheshi people getting all their education in Madhesh could not compete with Pahadi people having their education in hills where it is comparatively superior; they loose opportunities.

3. Poverty and Vulnerability

There is widespread poverty (45% of the Madhesh districts) among Madheshi community particularly Dalits, Muslims, Janjatis and other caste people living in traditional settlements who are nearly landless. They lack assets for economic production and the lack of food security has many widespread effects influencing health and nutritional standards as well as child education. It also forces them to have less concern for environmental considerations. Poverty and illiteracy increases vulnerability and in vulnerable society democratic values and democratization have very little meaning.

b) Economic Issues

1. Unemployment and Under Employment

In the absence of off-farm economic opportunities in villages, most of the people are under employed. In recent years, uneducated teenagers and the young people have temporarily migrated to India for economic opportunity – this has unbalanced labour supply to farming in many parts of Madhesh region. Again, there is unemployment for the educated Madheshi people in government or non-government organizations or in INGOs or international organizations working in Nepal primarily due to the exclusion behaviour of these institutions towards Madheshi. This is a serious issue to tackle.

2. Weak Social Organizations and Support Services

In the past two decades, social institutions advocating and working on social, economic and political development in Madhesh region have been formed by Madheshi community. Such entities are of varied natures and are based on castes and ethnicity, language, research and studies, human rights and advocacy, political rights, and socio-economic works. These organizations find hard to get financial and working support from the State as well as from the donor communities. In general, most of these organizations are committed to the cause of Madheshi community, but lack of coordination among them, missing unified vision, divided opinions, and unfocused objectives have made them inadequate in yielding desired results.

Again, the government support services are dwindling and have not yet reached in many villages where most of the households are Madheshi. Most of the project implementers at the district level are of hill origin and they tend to implement their programme in areas dominated by hill people due to various reasons such as good communication, high level of programme adaptation and so on.

3. Low Level of Investment and Lack of Economic Opportunity

Although government collects most of its revenue from Madhesh region, there is very little return in the form of investment in rural areas where majority of the Madhesi people live. Investment both from the government and the donor community in rural Madhesh appears to be very low. Most of the industries are located in urban centres and they could not much help the local rural people. Again, the agro-based industries established in the Madhesh region are not tied up with agriculture farming; they import raw materials from other countries which could be technically produced in Madhesh.

The issue of renovation and reconstruction of the Hulaki Road has been raised on many occasions. This road was constructed in early 20th century and connects the inner part of Madhesh region from Jhapa in the east to Kanchanpur in the west.

c) Political Issues

1. Basic Citizenship Rights

This is the major political issue still unresolved by the State or the political parties. Many of the Madheshi people who are landless or homeless – a large number of Dalits, Janjatis, Muslims and other caste people are landless- are denied of citizenship certificates. The government law and the public policies are not very clear and positive, and moreover, the persons at district level authorized to give citizenship certificates that are mostly high caste or affluent hill people usually show negative tendencies while granting citizenship. Denial of citizenship means no rights to get job in government, corporations or even private companies, can not get government support or loan from the bank or purchase land for housing or farming. Many Madheshi people have lost right to vote and it prevents them to participate in political life even at the village level. This is humiliating for the Madheshi people who are denied of their natural right.

2. Demarcation of Madhesh Districts

The current demarcation of Tarai districts does not follow any scientific, ecological or social basis. Amendment is required and a new demarcation needs to be done, which would include only the outer and Vitri Madhesh region for efficient socio-economic planning for holistic development. This would increase participation of Madheshi community decision-making process.

3. Participation in Political Arena

Low level of participation in policy and decision-making body of political parties such as central committees and lack of proportional representation in parliament are the emerging issues. The political parties have so far ignored emerging issues of Madhesh and Madheshi people and the under representation prohibits advocacy for betterment.

4. Census Mechanism

Many people believe that the results of the past census are not satisfactory; the data on Madhesh population and the resources they use do not seem to be accurate. Some sample survey done in the Madhesh area indicates much higher Madheshi population than shown in the last census.

5. Migration of People in Madhesh

Madhesh region is already over crowded and the resources are dwindling to maintain the increasing population. The issue of discouraging population to permanently migrate from hills and from the adjoining areas in India to Madhesh region has been very often raised.

7. RELEVANT RESEARCH AGENDA

The inclusion of Madheshi people in the national mainstream would be the main drag on the country’s economy. People believing in integration of societies often ask a question – how to achieve that goal? Social, economic and political exclusion exist in many countries and within a society or geographical area. However, there are some good examples of positively integrating the varied societies and nationalities within a country, which are all initiated at the economic and at the political level.

There is continued conceptual debate around the notions of exclusion and inclusion. How an excluded community or group could be included in the mainstream for nation building. Firstly, we need to understand the dynamic processes taking place which encourages different forms of exclusion in Nepal. The is lack of data and information on various sub components of social, economic and political exclusion. And then to investigate the institutional aspects which could prevent exclusion and promote recovery, regeneration and inclusion. These fact finding attributes would form the research agenda and discussed in a group before finalizing them.

The Inclusion of Madheshi community (33% of the country’s human resources) in the national mainstream would be the main drag on the country’s economy.

l We need to fully understand the dynamic processes taking place which causes different forms of exclusion or which could facilitate inclusion.

l There is lack of data and information on various sub-components of social, economic and political exclusion.

l Need to investigate ways and means to unite non-politically the scattered Madheshi social organisations representing all the ethnic Madheshi community for achieving the common goal of holistic development of Madhesh and Madheshi community.

l Data base to quantify strengths of Madheshi community: social organisations, studies and researches done in various field, literatures, people working in different area including physical, biological and social sciences.

l Need to investigate the institutional aspects, which could prevent exclusion and promote recovery and regeneration of the society and their inclusion.

l Need to investigate ways and means to unite non-politically the scattered Madheshi social organisations representing all the ethnic Madheshi community for achieving the common goal of holistic development of Madhesh and Madheshi community.

l Data base to quantify strengths of Madheshi community: social organisations, studies and researches done in various field, literatures, people working in different area including physical, biological and social sciences.

l Need to investigate the institutional aspects, which could prevent exclusion and promote recovery and regeneration of the society and their inclusion.

l Status of Madheshi women and children from all the castes and ethnic communities. Data base and authentic information to quantify the reasons for their backwardness in education, health, natural rights and in other relevant aspects. There is no or very little information on Madheshi women and children. This would be the major research agenda involving at least 70% of the total Madheshi population and needs to be funded adequately.

l All the major issues described earlier are the research agenda.

Address:
Dokhadol, Sanepa, Lalitpur
P.O.Box 8975; EPC 1830
Kathmandu, Nepal
Email: sgs@erma.wlink.com.np/ sgsjune10@yahoo.co.uk
References

Ahiraj, R (2006). Madhesh Vani (fortnightly newspaper). January 2006, Kathmandu, Nepal. Bista, DB (1967). The people of Nepal. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, HMG, Kathmandu, Nepal, 1967. Bista, DB (1991) Fatalism and Development Nepal’s Struggle for modernization, Patna Orient Longman, 1991. Byrne, D (1999). Social Exclusion. Open University Press, 1999. CBS (2002). Statistical Pocket Book Nepal. Central Bureau of Statistics, Kathmandu, Nepal. Clark, TW (1963). A First Year language Cpourse. Cambridge: Heffer, 1963 Dahal, DR (1996). Madhesiya Pahadiya Antar Sambandha (Madheshi Pahadi Inter-relationship). Himal, Kathmandu, September 1996. Gaige, FH (1975). Regionalism and National Unity in Nepal. Vikram Publishing House, Delhi, India, 1975. Gupta, J (2004). Madhesh: Social Demography and Discrimination. Madheshi Human Rights Conservation centre, Kathmandu, Nepal, 2004. Gupta, J., Yadav., U., Jha, HB., and Jha, AN (2004). Nepali Madhesi Ka Samasya. Centre for Protection of Madheshee’s Human Rights, Kathmandu, Nepal. Guring, H (1982). The Sociology of Election in Nepal: 1959-81, Asian Survey, Vol XXII, p.313, March 1982 ICIMOD (1997). Districts of Nepal: Indicators of Development. International centre for Integrated Mountain development, Kathmandu, Nepal, 1997. ISRSC (2004) District Development Profile of Nepal 2004. Informal Sector Research and Study Centre, Kathmandu, Nepal, August 2004. Jha., HB (1993). The Tarai Community and national Integration in Nepal. Centre for Economic and Technical Studies/ Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Kathmandu, Nepal, 1993. Lawoti, M (2001). Racial Discrimination toward the Indigenous peoples in Nepal. Non-government Report for the Third World Conference Against Racism (WCAR), Kathmandu, Nepal, 2001. Layachi, A (2001). Reform and the Politivs of Inclusion in the Maghrib. The journal of North African Studies, Vol. 5, Issue 3. Malangia, M (1997). Yo janakpur Ho (This is Janakpur). Majdoor Pustak Bhavan, janakpur, 1997. Nayak, P (1998). Economic Development and Social Exclusion in India. Delhi School of Economics, University of Delhi, India, 1998. Panday, DR (2001). Corruption, Governance and International Cooperation: Essays and Impressions on Nepal and South Asia. Transparency international, Kathmandu, 1998. Rana, P (1982). The Evolution of Nepalese Nationalism in Contemporary Nepal, pp 83 The Fourth Parliamentary Election, IIDS, Kathmadu, Nepal Shah, S (2001). The Politics of Exclusion. A paper presented at the American University in Washington DC, USA, March 2002. Shah, SG and Singh, GN (2001). Irrigation Development in Nepal: Investment, Efficiency and Institution. Research report Series No. 47., Winrock International, Kathmandu, Nepal, December 2001. Sharma, S. and Shah, SG (2002). Nepal report: The Link between Poverty and Environment – Situation Analysis and Strategy for Change. New ERA, November 2002. Singh, A. (2003) Restructuring of Nepali State: A Madheshi Perspective, New Delhi, 2003. Spate, OHK and Learmonth, ATA (1967). India and Pakistan: A General and Regional Geography, 3d ed., London, 1967. Upreti, BR (2002). Nepal: A Nation in search of Peace and Development. A Country Assessment Report, Swiss Agency for development and Cooperation, Berne. World Bank (2005). Citizens With (Out) Rights: Nepal Gender and Social Exclusion Assessment. Summary Report, The World Bank, Kathmandu Nepal, June 2005. Yadav, U (2003). Madheshi Vani. Madheshi Jana Adhikar Forum, Kathmandu, Nepal, 2003. Yadav, U (2005). Conspiracy against Madheshi. Madheshi People Rights Forum, Nepal, 2005.

संघीय गणतन्त्र
Your Many Identities
मधेशी अधिकारको कुरामा पहाडीहरुको सहभागीता
Hridayesh Tripathi Arrested
मधेशी पहचान
अइ आन्दोलनमें मधेशी अधिकारके बात
Janakpur Rally, Biggest In Nepal Since 1990
PCP: Pahadi Chauvinist Pig
Time For Madhesi Militancy Is Now

Monday, February 20, 2006

5 Point Agreement


10 Point Agreement To Succeed 12 Point Agreement
Possible Framework For A Negotiated Resolution

The Maoists are for a roundtable conference of the three forces. It is the king who has not come around to the idea. So I am imagining that roundtable conference. If it were upto me, the agreement would read as follows.

5 Point Agreement
  1. Today, the main desire of most Nepalis is to have democracy, peace, prosperity, social upliftment and an independent and sovereign Nepal. Without the establishment of complete democracy there will be no peace, progress and prosperity in the country.
  2. The seven party alliance, the Maoists and the king are committed to a constituent assembly elections to which will be held by an interim government functioning under an interim constitution that will make the interim prime minister the Commander In Chief of the army. Other parties represented in the last parliament will be invited to be part of the interim government. Krishna Prasad Bhattarai is to be the interim prime minister. Before the Maoists are invited to join the interim government, the two armies in the country are to be dismantled through external mediation and foreign aid from the mediating international powers is to be sought to provide a smooth transition for the soldiers in both armies into the civilian economy. It is hoped this will also facilitate the reintegration of the two factions of the Congress, the three factions of the RPP and the two factions of the Sadbhavana.
  3. The constituent assembly will be 300 representatives elected from constituencies of roughly equal population, roughly circular or square in shape, not respecting any of the administrative boundaries in the country. The assembly will be given six months to shape a democratic constitution for the country, and such a document is to be put to a referendum. Upon accepted by the people, it becomes the supreme law of the land.
  4. The constituent assembly will decide on all issues except the issue of a constitutional monarchy. The constitutional monarchy will stay protected, the guarantee resting with the Supreme Court. However, the constituent assembly may draw a constitution that will allow the next parliament to abolish the monarchy with a 75% vote.
  5. A Truth And Reconciliation Commission is to be set up that is to let all victims of the 10 year civil war a voice, but this is to be a healing rather than a judicial process. General amnesty is to be granted to the warring parties.
Rationale

Ditch the House revival idea. You will notice there is no mention of the idea of House revival. One, there is no provision in the 1990 constitution for such a revival. That 1990 constitution is dead anyway. Two, there has to be some give and take, and the seven party alliance has to be more flexible than the other two camps in the spirit of the democratic spirit. Three, House revival as the starting point for all future developments makes the royal camp jittery. If the monarchy is to be reorganized or eliminated, it is natural they might want to have a say in the process. Finally, House revival is about going backward, constituent assembly is about going forward.

Krishna Prasad Bhattarai. He could soothe nerves in all three camps like no other person.

Dismantle the two armies. Having two standing armies before the country goes through elections to a constituent assembly is out of question. Integrating the two armies would be highly problematic. They have been at each other's throats. Both armies are bloated. It would be too big an army, too expensive. Nepal is not about to go to war with either India or China, ever. A poor country needs to be spending on education and health, not on defense. Both are Pahadi armies while Madhesis are half the population. Neither have the looks of a national army. It is social justice to dismantle both.

300 constituents of roughly equal population. That is the demcratic way, the one person one vote way.

Don't End The Monarchy Now. They say pick your fights. Taming the army and ending the monarchy all at once is a little too ambitious. Besides, it is for the people to decide where they stand on the monarchy. And it is worth it to compromise with the monarchy on this issue. Even if they stay on, they will never be able to wage another attack on democracy ever again. On the other hand, the monarchy could come to an end, but only during stage three. There is plenty of other work to be done during stages one and two. The 75% vote margin is not too high. Just the seven party alliance is 90% strong. To that you could add the Maoists in the next parliament. If all of them want the monarchy gone, it will be gone. Only that will be a non convulsive way of ending the monarchy. If the monarchy does not even have a 25% popularity in the country, it does not deserve to stick around. On the other hand, by the time there is peace and total disarmament, and a new constitution, and a new parliament, and full fledged democracy, by then most of the parties might no longer have any anger left with the monarchy, and the monarchy might stay on. But I am neutral. I think it is for the Nepali people to decide where they stand. I am not even interested in swaying public opinion one way or the other. I do not want to look down upon Nepalis who might have an affection for the monarchy any more than I want to look down upon Hindus who worship idols. I am not a Hindu. On the other hand, I am not up for putting up with a monarchy that might impose itself upon a people.

Trusting the roadmap, not the Maoists. As to if they are really for multi-party democracy or not, I don't want to trust them. I want a roadmap that I can trust. And this roadmap is it. There is little room for later Maoist revisions.

5 Point Agreement, Version 2
  1. When Chairman Gyanendra and Chairman Prachanda are to meet for the first time, they are to greet each other with high fives.
  2. There is to be a clear upper limit to the state budget allocation for the interim prime minister's paan and related expenses.
  3. Hridayesh Tripathy and Badri Mandal are to attempt to get back on talking terms.
  4. Girija Koirala is to be given a maximum 10 years more in active politics, beyond which he must retire.
  5. Manisha Koirala is to be "used" to encourage a large electoral participation during the run up to the elections to the constituent assembly.
The Ball Is In The King's Court

Either the king take the initiative for a roadmap like this one, or he face a decisive showdown that will sweep the monarchy off the national scene. I think that is where we are headed.

In The News

House arrest of top UML leader extended NepalNews
Over a dozen opposition leaders freed
NC-D concerned over denial of medical treatment to leaders
Rights activists barred from meeting UML general secy
The ball is now in the parties' court: Giri

Nepal parties rule out democracy talks with king Daily Times, Pakistan
INTERVIEW-Nepal's Maoists switch strategy as war drags on Reuters AlertNet
Nepal talks Calcutta Telegraph
Police raid newspaper office in West Nepal
Hindustan Times, India
Nepal courts free 17 leaders after royal crackdown ABC Asia Pacific
Nepal's Supreme Court orders royal government to release 37 ... Contra Costa Times
Concerns on Nepal Situation in Canada
NewsLine Nepal, Nepal

Social inclusion of Madheshi community in nation building INSN
NSP-A: list of arrested
Harmony: Canada’s foreign minister speaks on Nepal
An automatic gun
The plot thickens around the palace
CPN(UML): open letter to Mr. Ian Martin
Ten years of Maoist insurgency

He Acts. And Then We React UWB
Dr. Tulsi Giri Explains The Royal Message

Visitors


20 February10:38Harvard University, Cambridge, United States
20 February10:44FalconStream, Kuwait
20 February13:34Fastweb, Italy


20 February15:17Telekom Malaysia, Malaysia
20 February16:42Shyam Internet Services P.Ltd., Jaipur, India
20 February16:49Avnet, Inc., Phoenix, United States


20 February17:02Drexel University, United States
20 February17:12American Red Cross, National Headquarters, Falls Church, United States
20 February18:12United States Army, United States
20 February18:54ETB S.A., Colombia
20 February19:48United States Army, United States
20 February20:22Georgia Public Web, United States

February 20 Event In Baltimore


Dinesh Tripathi, "Arthur Kinoy Of Nepal"
Dinesh Tripathi In New York
Dinesh Tripathi: In Person

Human Rights Situation in Nepal And Role of International Community


By Dinesh Tripathi



Human Rights Lawyer

Supreme Court, Nepal


Sponsored by International Student Association

February 20
4:00 pm
University of Baltimore

M. Scot Kaufman
Auditorium (BC 123)

Reception to follow
in BC Atrium

Open to Public



Photos

Democracy Day: Tyranny Celebrates UWB

In The News

HM for activating democratic process NepalNews
Opposition leaders and analysts are not convinced
Opposition parties call for decisive fight for the restoration of democracy
AI urges government for the release rights activists and political detainees
Maoists loot fire brigade vehicle in Dhangadhi
Indian opposition leader demands meeting on Nepal
Rights situation has further deteriorated after the royal takeover: Prasain

Visitors

19 February08:19Comcast Communications, Elkridge, United States
19 February08:58Purdue University, West Lafayette, United States
19 February09:56Michigan Technological Inst., Houghton, United States
19 February10:24Road Runner, New York, United States
19 February10:27Skynet Belgacom, Belgium
19 February11:13Columbia University, United States


19 February11:13Michigan State University, United States
19 February11:14Telenet, Belgium

Sunday, February 19, 2006

The King Is Nowhere Close To Seeing The Light


Beloved Countrymen,

As we celebrate the 56th National Democracy Day today, we pay homage to our august grandfather His late Majesty King Tribhuvan and all the brave souls who laid down their lives for the cause of democracy.

To ensure that an exercise in democracy is meaningful and sustainable, the people�s right to elect representatives of their choice must be recognised as sacrosanct. The Nepalese people have demonstrated their faith in the power of the ballot during the recently held municipal elections. In spite of the apparently adverse environment, the courage shown by them is indeed commendable. The commitment of the people has led to the victory of democracy. The Nepalese people have been encouraged by this success to install all representative bodies through election and sustainable peace.

Peace and democracy are the aspirations of all. The nation, therefore, seeks solidarity amongst all who have faith in multiparty democracy. This solidarity must be achieved at the earliest so as to formulate a mechanism which ensures that peace and democracy are never again jeopardised. In the coming days as well, democracy can be reenergised with the activation of all representative bodies through the electoral process. Our continued interaction with the people has led us to believe that the time has come for all those who believe in these ideals to chart a course ahead, with the welfare of the nation uppermost. We, therefore, call on all willing political parties to come forth to fully activate, at the earliest, the stalled democratic process in the greater interest of the nation. Let us listen to others, put across our views, do away with discord and enhance mutual understanding; let us consolidate peace and democracy.

Inspired by our glorious tradition of patriotism, those who have been misguided should, without further delay, enter the mainstream of peace and multiparty democracy, eschewing the path of violence and destruction.

We are committed to upholding and safeguarding the Constitution in the greater interest and progress of the Nepalese people. It will do well to remember that democracy will be secure only when the rule of law is upheld and the Constitution alone forms the basis of rule of law.

May this day inspire us to activate a democratic process dedicated to sustainable peace and welfare of the country as well as initiate a new chapter of understanding amongst us all. May those who sacrificed their lives to usher in democracy and all those who place the dignity and glory of the nation above all else inspire us in achieving these noble objectives.

May Lord Pashupatinath bless us all !
Jaya Nepal !
Nepal's king invites parties for talks Reuters AlertNet, UK

This misleading headline from Reuters threw me off balance for just a little bit. I furiously looked for the full text of the speech. The Rising Nepal is the only place I found it. The text cured me of any momentary illusions.

This guy is absolutely, totally nowhere close to seeing the light. He does not intend to see the light.

The democrats have consistently made the mistake of thinking maybe they will jack up the movement one notch and that will be enough, the king will invite the parties for talks, like Birendra did. I just don't see that happening. There is something about this guy that leads me to believe he just will not go for that. He just does not have that kind of a makeup.

It is time for the international powers to impose sanctions and for the seven party alliance to wage a decisive round of protests.

Krishna Prasad Bhattarai

Bhattarai call for unity addressing some two dozen leaders and political analysts in his residence, Bhattarai said that executive power should be hand over to the people...... He however objected to the reinstatement of the House of Representatives...... urged the leaders of Nepali Congress (NC) and Nepali Congress-Democratic (NC-D) to work for unification of the party at this critical political situation........ asked NC President Girija Prasad Koirala and NC-D President Sher Bahadur Deuba to initiate the process of party unification. ..... Soon after the release on Monday, Deuba in a press meet said that he was in favour of an honourable unification of the party.

I am glad Bhattarai has come out opposing the idea of House revival. The 1990 constitution allows for neither House revival, nor a constituent assembly. But a political decision has to be made to go for a constituent assembly. But if you revive the House, you resurrect the dead 1990 constitution, and when you do that, you are in the trap that the 1990 constitution does not allow for a constituent assembly. That means if you were to magically revive the House, you will also have to magically dissolve that same House and kill the dead and revived 1990 constitution to go for a constituent assembly. Why would you want to revive a House that can not be revived only to have to dissolve it soon after? The very idea of a constituent assembly is to give the country a new constitution. Why do you want to resurrect a dead constitution if you want to give the country a new constitution?

Girija, Deuba, Gyanendra, Gagan

If Girija only had issues with Gyanendra, I would think it is because one is an autocrat, another a democrat. But he also has issues with Deuba, with Gagan, with Krishna Prasad Bhattarai himself.

Girija tried to run the government through remote control when Deuba was Prime Minister. Debua did not like it, and I don't blame him. Girija pushed Deuba into dissolving the House. That is the political perspective.

Deuba has time and again expressed his commitment to an honorable unification of the two Congress factions, but Koirala has to rub Deuba's nose in the dust.

Gagan is up and coming. 62 of the 75 district chiefs of the Nepal Students Union support him, but Koirala goes and appoints someone else.

Now that Koirala is for House revival, and Bhattarai against it, the two honchos need to hold a summit where they talk it out. By the time the summit is over, they should have only one stand on this issue of House revival. Hum tum ek kamre mein bund ho aur chabhi kho jaye.

The king came out for an all party government several times. But Koirala would have none of it.

It would be wonderful to have a House. It would symbolize democracy. But sometimes you have to let go of the fantassy. There has to be some give and take.

In The News

Diaspora for democracy Murari Sharma Kantipur Publications
American paranoia
Twin Pillars: Is India doing a rethink on Nepal?
अमेरिकी महामहिमलाई विनम्र अनुरोध Bamdev Gautam

HM for activating democratic process NepalNews
Martin meets leaders
Bhattarai call for unity
Nepal may face sanction: Rights activists
EU mulling 'strong resolution' on Nepal; Ireland for ‘smart sanction’
Try military cases in “Civilian Courts”: Martin

Nepal's communist rebels call for strike San Jose Mercury News

Visitors


16 February02:20Hokkaido University, Japan
16 February02:49Asia Infonet Co., Ltd., Thailand
16 February05:24Blueyonder, Edinburgh, United Kingdom
16 February05:27U.N. Development Programme, Norway
16 February05:46Warwick University, Coventry, United Kingdom
16 February06:46South Africa (any.za)
16 February08:08Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
16 February09:18Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd, India
16 February09:21Massachusetts Inst of Technology, Cambridge, United States
16 February09:33University of North Texas, Denton, United States
16 February09:51Tiscali, Italy
16 February11:02Montgomery College, United States
16 February11:03Universities Scotland, Edinburgh, United Kingdom
17 February01:32Infocom Pvt. Ltd., Nepal
17 February04:23Leeds University, Leeds, United Kingdom
17 February04:38Connect Internet Solutions Pty Ltd., Australia
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17 February11:49Frontier Communications, Statesboro, United States
18 February20:47Communication Authority, Thailand
18 February22:34Globe Telecom, Philippines

Thursday, February 16, 2006

Moriarty Deserves Your Ears


Moriarty is an American. I am in America. I grew up in Nepal. Moriarty is the American ambassador in Nepal. I have always been aware of this common ground. America is not a monolithic country like the Maoists imagine. Moriarty is an emissary of a Republican president, I root for Democrats. America's complexity as a country goes way beyond its two largest parties. But America does have the distinction of being the oldest democracy. And it is two years younger than Nepal. But it is not Nepal that is the richest country on the planet right now. So maybe there is something to this democracy thing the Americans talk about. That is a simplistic way of putting where I come from ideologically. On the other hand, America does not pretend to be a finished product democracy, but very much a country always trying to forge "a more perfect union." The country is always a work in progress.

I was not too aware of Moriarty before 2/1 but have followed him closely since then. He is a hard nosed realist. Ever since 2/1 I have jumped around trying to do the political thing as regard the Maoists. But I made an acknowledgment early on that Moriarty's realism, even if it is exaggerated, which I don't know it is, is what allows me to do my political thing. Take Moriarty out of the picture and me and others like me will have to do all the worrying that Moriarty specializes in, and without any of his resources.

Moriarty opposed the idea of the parties talking to the Maoists. And I opposed him: Moriarty's Irresponsible Mainstream. I wanted the talks to go on. But I was critical of what came out of the talks. (10 Point Agreement To Succeed 12 Point Agreement) Why will the Maoist army still be standing when the country goes through a constituent assembly? I hope Moriarty is wrong, but what if he is not? I do not want to trust the Maoists. I want a roadmap that I can trust. If they are not for a multi-party framework, then it is not possible to do business with them. If they are for a multi-party framework, why do they still want to have an army when the country goes through a constituent assembly? That army might be under temporary UN supervision, but their loyalty will still be to Prachanda. Nothing will prevent Prachanda from going back to the jungle if he might not like the results of the constituent assembly. (Lenin, Mao)

One good thing about Prachanda and the Maoists is they are at least open. They tell you their intentions. (Narayan Singh Pun, I Want Your Number) Obviously his idea of what a multi-party democracy is is different from your and mine. Will he please spell out that difference? He needs to. And the seven parties need to take a look at that.

But the weakest part of Moriarty's arguments is that he never even mentions the idea of a constituent assembly. A constituent assembly is the only way to peace and democracy in Nepal. There is no other way. That might also be the only way to disarm the Maoists. (The Foreign Powers Need To Come Clean On The Constituent Assembly Question)

America, Europe and India are like the Nepali Congress before that party came forth for a constituent assembly. (Time For The Nepali Congress To Take A Stand On The Constituent Assembly Question) It wanted House revival but not a constituent assembly. Now it wants both.

Moriarty also underestimates the amount of pain the king has inflicted upon the democratic camp. But to his credit, he does make it absolutely clear that it is for the king to seek common ground with the parties. The ball is in the king's court. That is sound academic analysis. But statecraft would be to force the king to do so by announcing support to the idea of a constituent assembly, but one before which either the country has only one standing army, integrated, or none. Personally I want both the armies totally dismantled. These two armies kill their own people, that is all they do. Why would the people pay them to do that?

Moriarty's speech is in tune with an article I co-authored with Dipta Shah recently. Dipta and I just excitedly talked about it on the phone, drawing parallels between what Moriarty has to say, and what we have to say. Moriarty is not trying to take sides. He is just trying to make sure the worst case scenario does not unfold. We should not exhibit ostrich behavior. Instead, if we disagree with Moriarty's analysis, we should say so, and we should say why, and then we should listen to what he might have to say in return. We should give him our ears if only to prove him untrue.

Possible Framework For A Negotiated Resolution



Nepal's Political Crisis: A Look Back, A Look Forward

Ambassador James F. Moriarty
Speech to the Ganesh Man Singh Academy February 15, 2006

Namaste.

Thank you, Soni, and thanks to Dr. Bhandari and all of the members of Ganesh Man Singh Academy for co-hosting this event with the American Center.

I would like to dedicate these remarks today to four Nepali citizens: Bijaya Lal Das, Tribeni Majhi, Jitendra Shrestha, and Umesh Thapa. All recently perished. To my knowledge, I never ever met any of them. I'll return to them at the end of these remarks.

***

I address you exactly one week after the February 8 municipal polls, and one year and two weeks since King Gyanendra took over the reins of government on February 1, 2005. I want to talk to you today about this momentous period, and offer some thoughts on what the future might - or could - hold for Nepal.

At the outset, I wish to take note of the ruling by the Supreme Court this week to abolish the Royal Commission for Corruption Control, which also enabled the release of former prime minister Sher Bahadur Deuba. This decision was a positive step, and it was encouraging to see this issue settled through the rule of law.

As the polls just occurred, let me also note my country's official view on their relevancy. Just as we had feared, the municipal elections unfortunately proved a hollow exercise. Elections are the fundamental building block of democracy, and we would have liked to have seen municipal elections that served this function. Yet the continuing polarization between the monarchy and the major political parties prevented this. The major parties boycotted the polls, relatively few candidates ran, and few citizens voted. In sum, the elections represented yet another missed opportunity to effectively begin tackling Nepal's political problems.

The Maoists, however, were not content to urge a boycott of the polls they deemed illegitimate. Instead, they unleashed violence to thwart the vote. The insurgents threatened candidates and their families and even assassinated two office seekers. Absolutely nothing justifies such measures, and all supporters of a just and peaceful Nepal should condemn them.

As for the year of authoritarian rule by the palace, it has clearly been unsuccessful. The results of the past year are the opposite of what the monarchy envisioned in seizing power in early 2005. As my government said to mark the first anniversary of the royal takeover, "Twelve months of palace rule have only made the situation more precarious, emboldened the Maoist insurgents, and widened the division between the country's political parties and the King." This is a harsh - but accurate - summation of palace rule. Yet the monarchy persists in its hard-line policy, its face set against the parties. In frustration, they have turned to the Maoists to seek political leverage against the palace.

The King and the parties, in fact, seem locked in a circle of mistrust, going round and round - but never advancing - as they launch continuous charges at each other of ill-will, animosity, and condemnation. Meanwhile, Nepal's desperate need for peace, security, and democracy only deepens. Moreover, both sides seem to view the insurgents as a kind of bargaining chip in their ongoing struggle of wills. "How can we use the Maoists to advance our immediate political position?" they seem to independently ask themselves. These leaders should rather answer a far more difficult but essential question: "How can we work together to return democracy to Nepal, and defeat the Maoist threat to our country and its people?"

Without real progress between the two legitimate political forces, the Maoists will only continue to gain advantage - in the countryside, among people of goodwill tired of the King-parties standoff, and among others who desperately believe, or want to believe, that the insurgents will shed their ideological stripes and join the political mainstream. Alas, wishing that something were so does not make it that way, as we all learn in life. But the political parties, who entered the 12-point understanding with the insurgents in November, seem to want to do exactly that - to wish away or otherwise ignore the uncomfortable fact that their Maoist partners are committed to violence to achieve political ends. In this regard, here are some questions that I have asked myself in recent weeks, with the uncomfortable answers I have reached:

* Question: Are the Maoists truly committed to peace and democracy, as the 12-point understanding suggests?

Not if you read the understanding itself. And certainly not if you read the recent statements of a senior Maoist, Baburam Bhattarai. The very first point in the understanding underscores that the signatories - parties and Maoists - will "establish absolute democracy - with all forces focusing their attack against the autocratic monarchy." For the Maoists, this simply means they will continue employing murder, extortion, and intimidation as tactics of choice. The Maoist leader provided chilling insight in this regard in several articles in different Nepali publications in recent weeks. For instance, if autocracy is to be defeated, he argued in a Samaya article, "armed and unarmed struggle must go hand-in hand."

* Another question: Are the Maoists committed to joining the political mainstream?

Actually, a close reading of the understanding reveals that the insurgents seek to bring the parties further into their sphere, and to the Maoists' advantage. Again, Bhattarai made Maoist thinking clear in several other articles. "Since our working policy [with the parties] is now the same, we have forged this partnership," he said of the 12-point agreement. "But tomorrow if the nature of the political intercontradiction changes, the nature of our relations could change as well." The translation here is icy: The Maoists pledge their partnership with the parties, until ... they don't need them any longer.

* Still one more question: If the parties and Maoists were ever able to topple the monarchy, what then?

The answer here is particularly worrisome: The Maoists would be armed; the parties would be unarmed. Presumably, to have reached this point, the Maoists would have co-opted or neutralized most parts or all of the Royal Nepalese Army, thereby removing the parties' one logical source of defense. Maybe this is the moment Bhattarai has in mind when he speaks about the "political intercontradiction" changing. In any case, this stark scenario leaves the parties, and the people, defenseless against ideological "partners" long used to settling arguments with a gun.

These questions are provocative, which is their aim. After all, if ever the phrase "politics makes strange bedfellows" was appropriate, it is in Nepal in 2006. When the Maoists took up arms in 1996, they were attacking a struggling Parliamentary system; they killed hundreds of party activists and chased the parties out of the countryside. More recently, however, lack of leadership and unwillingness to compromise, primarily but not totally from the side of the monarchy, has resulted in a curious polarization. Two legitimate constitutional actors - who should be on the same side - are divided, with one of them aligned with a separate violent force that has long sought a totalitarian state.

At first glance, as mentioned previously, there seems much about the 12-point understanding that is hopeful. But the United States views the uneasy partnership between the parties and the Maoists as wrongheaded. Worse, as the questions posed earlier underscore, we believe cooperation along current lines between the Maoists and the parties is fraught with danger - for the political parties themselves, and for the future of the Nepalese people. Political terror by the Maoists, practiced with particular ferocity in the run-up to the municipal elections, sets a fearsome precedent and could impair the democratic credentials of their political party partners.

An interview with in the Kantipur newspapers caused some to swoon over the Maoist leaders' apparent democratic leanings. Yet the Maoists themselves underscored the danger of cooperating on their terms, if anyone cares to pay attention. In the same interview, the Maoist known as Prachanda urged widening of the armed struggle that has bloodied Nepal for 10 years. He said, and I quote: "We say, let's make a common army for constituent assembly and a democratic government of the parties and the Maoists. Let's form a parallel government of the parties and Maoists." A parallel government with a parallel army? This is a recommendation that the political parties join the Maoists in an underground, violent struggle against the state -- a formula to expand the bloodshed and misery in Nepal for the advantage of the Maoists, not to seek a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the conflict. I know what the response by Mahatma Gandhi, or indeed, K.P. Bhattarai would have been to such a suggestion.

Of course, to Maoist thinking, bloodshed is the byproduct of politics. Consider Prachanda's speculation in a BBC interview this week that, in five years' time, the King will "either be executed by the people's court or maybe exiled." Or, as Baburam Bhattarai noted in another interview last week, "every revolution in history demands its quota of sacrifice if it has to succeed." Presumably, he is thinking of the final sacrifice other Nepalese men, women, and children have made or will be forced to make for his revolution.

Now it's true that when the King took power last year, many were hopeful that the goals he cited for his action would be achieved. They were not. The international community recognizes this, as do many patriotic Nepalese citizens. Perhaps the government does as well, but balks at reconciliation with its legitimate partners because of fear that it may look weak or that it otherwise may no longer "control" Nepal's destiny. On the first concern, no honest supporter of reconciliation and progress would fault the King for reaching out to the parties and returning the country to democracy. On the contrary, such decisive leadership would be roundly welcomed. On controlling Nepal's destiny, I repeat, this is exactly the issue. Without engaging the legitimate civilian political forces, the palace is continuing to lose control of its ability to shape the country's future. And the Maoists only gain confidence and influence as this polarization eases their divide-and-conquer strategy.

As I have done repeatedly, and as the commander of the U.S. Pacific Command did in Nepal here two weeks ago, the United States continues to call for reconciliation between the King and parties. We did so again last week after the failure of the municipal elections. Major international partners have urged a similar course. I make the same common sense plea here today.

There is no other practical, workable solution to your constitutional crisis and to effectively face the most immediate, as well as the most serious long-term, threat to your peace and prosperity - the insurgency. To establish a foundation of trust, the United States believes it is up to the King to initiate this dialogue, assuring the major political parties and the Nepalese people that the monarchy is serious about returning democracy and peace to Nepal. And, once such an opening occurs - sooner rather than later, I hope - we urge the political parties to respond and enter talks in good faith.

Hard compromise, tough give and take, will be required if the monarchy and the parties are to hammer out a return to democracy and devise an effective response to the growing Maoist threat. This kind of negotiating, moreover, will not lend itself to daily headline seeking and one-upmanship by press release. At some point, for the sake of Nepal, senior party and palace leaders must gather together in a room and begin hashing out the hard details of the way forward. No one else can do it for them.

And there certainly is no way for the parties or the King to successfully ride the Maoist tiger for their own advantage. One could easily fall off - and tigers get hungry.

I'll be blunt: there is no easy way out of Nepal's current crisis. History and common sense, as well as their leaders' own statements, suggest that the Maoists will feel no need to abandon their goal of absolute power as long as they believe they are winning. And as long as the King and the Parties remain divided, and as long as there is no coherent strategy in place to roll back the massive gains the Maoists have made over the past decade, the Maoists will rightfully conclude that they are winning. The simple, but unpalatable, truth is that, there will be no real reason for the Maoists to compromise until they begin to see in the areas they now terrorize:

  • security and government authority being reestablished;
  • development occurring according to the wishes of the people rather than at the whims of the Maoists;
  • economic and social reforms taking hold; and,
  • normal political activities, including both the unhampered presence of political parties and, dare I say it, local elections, being resumed.
Until that day, I fear, the understandable hopes that the Maoists will simply tire of their struggle or decide that a genuine multi-party system is preferable to their own unchallenged rule will prove mistaken.

And only a unified civilian and democratic government will be able to begin the process of convincing the Maoists that they will not be able to impose their will on the people of Nepal. The United States, for one, would look eagerly for ways to assist a new Nepal government that respects and supports democracy, human rights, and freedom. This also could include renewing assistance for the Royal Nepalese Army. I am confident that other nations, friends of Nepal, would do the same.

I hope the immediate future I have outlined sounds appealing, if difficult. Such a future calls for statesmanship and vision from all of Nepal's legitimate political actors. First, to protect their reputation as supporters of peace and democracy in Nepal, the parties could consider issuing a strong public statement unequivocally warning their Maoist partners about the unacceptability of violence. Second, the palace needs to devise some effective gesture to make absolutely clear its willingness to enter formal and concrete talks with the major political parties to restore democratic government in Nepal and address the Maoist threat.

Finally, I return to the cynical Maoist mantra, "every revolution demands its quota of sacrifice." And here I point to three of the people to whom I dedicated these remarks.

  • Bijaya Lal Das was president of the Nepal Sadhbhawana Party Dhansusha district, who had announced his candidacy for Mayor of Janakpur Municipality.
  • Tribenj Majhi had been elected unopposed as ward chairman of Biratnagar Municipality - 15. He belonged to the same party.
  • Jitendra Shrestha, only 24, had been a taxi driver in Kathmandu.
Maoists murdered all three in recent days. I mean no disrespect here. I cite these victims merely to remind us all of the unacceptable human cost of Nepal's ongoing tragedy. Three fellow humans were murdered because someone else with a gun thought their deaths would advance a particular political viewpoint.

There was also a fourth victim -- Umesh Thapa, a party activist shot by security forces after a rally protesting the municipal elections. His death served as a tragic reminder of the deep and growing divisions between the government and the legitimate political parties. My fervent hope is that, instead of using his death for short-term advantage, the government and the parties will view his sacrifice as a catalyst for reconciliation and compromise.

For Nepal is now facing a choice between three possible futures: If the King and the Parties reconcile, they can find a path back to genuine democracy and an effective means to counter the insurgency. If the King and his government opt for greater repression, their attempts will ultimately fail and Nepal will suffer greater misery and bloodshed. And if the armed Maoists and unarmed parties successfully implement Prachanda's and Baburam Bhattarai's vision of a violent revolution, the Maoists will ultimately seize power, and Nepal will suffer a disaster that will make its current problems pale in comparison.

Nepalis themselves will choose which future they want. The outside world is eager to help, but can do nothing if the wrong path is chosen. I love your country and I believe that the Nepali people are among the finest and hardest-working that I have met anyplace in the world. For that reason, I hope and pray that everyone in this room and everyone who hears my words in whatever form does everything possible to ensure that the leaders of your country choose the path of reconciliation, democracy, and genuine peace in the coming weeks and months.

Jaya Nepal! 1


Nepal's Royal Mess

By James F. Moriarty

15 February 2006

The Wall Street Journal

For the past decade, Nepal has faced two overarching and intertwined challenges: how to establish a functioning democracy and how to defeat a stubborn Maoist insurgency. Unfortunately, instead of cooperating to address these challenges, King Gyanendra has further alienated Nepal's political parties over the past year, leading to significant military and political advances by the Maoists. Unless the king and the seven major political parties reconcile soon, this mountain kingdom could slide into chaos.

The U.S. has always understood Nepal's struggle to prevent a takeover by the Maoists, who took up arms against the country's then-parliamentary government in 1996. The king's assumption of "temporary" authoritarian power on Feb. 1, 2005, was premised on fighting the terrorist group, with the promise to return Nepal to democracy in three years' time. Last week's municipal polls, the first in seven years, were supposed to be the first step.

As the polling day drew closer, however, it became clear that the elections were merely the king's attempt to legitimize his autocratic rule. Instead of reaching out to the major political parties, the government placed opposition leaders under house arrest and rounded up hundreds of political activists. Instead of accepting media freedom, the government has cracked down on Nepal's lively independent media.

As a result, voter turnout was predictably low. In Kathmandu, less than 25% of voters turned out; in some places outside the capital turnout was half that level. Nationwide, only 15% of seats were contested and 54% had no candidates. Most significantly, the nation's seven major political parties boycotted the vote, labeling it a sham. And in large part, it was.

Given the palace's failure to include the parties in the process, their boycott was understandable. In contrast, the Maoist violence -- assassinating candidates, bombing their homes and threatening potential candidates and their families -- is despicable. On Monday, the terrorist group's leader, known as Prachanda, appeared on BBC television and speculated about the king's possible exile or execution.

There have been attempts at compromise in the past. Frustrated by the continued standoff with the palace, the seven opposition parties entered into a 12-point understanding with the Maoists in November, during a four-month unilateral cease-fire called by the insurgents. A close reading, however, should give real pause to those who hoped that the 12-point document signaled a Maoist willingness to come into the mainstream. The understanding calls to "establish absolute democracy by ending autocratic monarchy, with all forces focusing their attack against the autocratic monarchy independently." In short, the Maoists merely promised to continue what they have done for 10 years -- that is, to murder, abduct, extort and otherwise terrorize Nepal's people in the pursuit of power.

Aside from Prachanda's recent inflammatory remarks, Baburam Bhattarai, the Maoists' No. 2, drove this home in a series of op-ed pieces in Nepalese newspapers last month, stating "armed and unarmed struggle must go hand-in-hand." Mr. Bhattarai has stated explicitly that the Maoists hope to combine Maoist armed struggle with the political parties' unarmed struggle to topple the monarchy.

This puts Nepal's political parties in an awkward position. While proclaiming themselves champions of democracy, peace and prosperity, they find themselves in "partnership" with a movement that settles arguments with a gun.

The time for honest dialogue and compromise between the king and the parties is long overdue. The U.S. stands ready to deepen its relationship with Nepal and engage it on a variety of issues, including renewed assistance for the Royal Nepalese Army. But first we need to see movement toward democracy, human rights and freedom by Nepal's government. Nepal's legitimate political forces must overcome their deep animosities. Until they unite, there is little reason to hope that the Maoists will unilaterally abandon their addiction to violence or their hopes for a totalitarian state.

Mr. Moriarty is the U.S. ambassador to Nepal. 1


Visitors

16 February16:57Purdue University, West Lafayette, United States
16 February17:24ONPT, Morocco
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16 February18:26United States (kelleyoil.com)
16 February18:33Cisco Systems, Inc., United States
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16 February20:10Telekom Malaysia Berhad, Malaysia
16 February21:46Illinois State University, Normal, United States
16 February23:01Beaumont, United States (lamar.edu)




The Demosphere Manifesto


The Demosphere Manifesto

by Mary Joyce, Paramendra Bhagat

Preamble: So Let Us Begin

The number of human beings on the planet is finite. The number of countries on the planet is finite. It is possible to create a democratic spectrum based on the rubric that, in a democracy, citizens have ultimate control over the policies of their governments. We look at the list of non-democracies and lay them out along a spectrum: some autocracies are worse than others. Some democracies are "illiberal". We take all this into account and we work to identify individuals and groups in and from those countries that are working to establish democracy in their respective countries. Such activists exist in all countries. Whether they are few or many, effective or ineffective, they are there. However, the worse the autocracy, the harder the task, the less vibrant that activist community might be. Then we use digital technology - websites, e-mail, chat rooms, online forums, blogs - to connect these activists with one another. One country group learns from another, there would be cross-pollination in terms of learning strategies, techniques, message honing.

Article 1: Bridge Activists

A problem presents itself. Most autocracies are in the Global South. In these countries there is limited access to the internet. How can we expect to reach out to democracy activists using the internet if most of these activists don't even have daily access to computers? This is where "bridge activists" come in. Bridges activists are tech-savvy. They know how to use the internet and they have regular access to it. They are also in contact with other local activists, activists who may not be so knowledgeable about the internet. Bridge activists are a bridge between the knowledge and political experience available on the internet and local activists working on the ground. In this way, the leap can be made from the grassroots to an international digital democracy network in a single step, through a single type of activist.

Article 2: The Demosphere

What is this international digital democracy network? It is the demosphere. It is an informal network of blogs, websites, and digital citizens who support democracy and want to empower local democracy activists. It is a digital ecosystem. The pieces exist, but they are not yet connected. A digital network for democracy must be created. It will be created by individuals who believe in the network and who inform others about it and connect them to it.

Article 3: The Role of Bloggers

Some of the most powerful bridge activists in this movement will be bloggers. There are three basic components to power for any democracy movement: money, message, organization. Blogs are great ways to marshall all three. Blogs make possible politics at the speed of thought. Blogs empower the individual. Sometimes you end up with armchair revolutionaries but some bloggers are also activists. With time, they may also become bridge activists. Blog networks are also in the position to form the basis of a larger digital democracy network. A blog is one star. A blogalaxy is many stars. A blogalaxy has many individual and group blogs all interlinked to each other through blogrolls, RSS feeds, e-mail lists. These blogalaxies can be a foundation from which the demosphere can grow.

The demosphere will be in the background. Screen time will always be secondary to face time. The most difficult work will be done in the organizing among those that might not even be online. This will be the job of the bridge activist and his/her online supporters. The demosphere will be an extensive, sophisticated. support system: something important, but in the background.

Article 4: Access

Chances are, most people not living in democracies are poor, do not have internet access, are possibly illiterate. According to a document by the World Economic Forum, in 2003 10% of people in the Global South had internet access. In the rich countries, this figure is closer to 40%. However, 10% translates into a higher level of access than people may think. People in most large cities and towns on the planet can get online from an internet cafe for a few cents an hour. Maybe the computer is old, the service is slow, and even the low fee prohibits frequent use, but the possibility is there.

But then again, not everyone has to come online, not everyone has to blog. There might be language barriers online. This is where bridge activists come into play. People and groups who can not or do not come online have access to bridge activists who are online and connected, inside and outside the country.

Article 5: Diasporas

Diasporas are also important because expatriates will be key bridge activists. Functional, effective, egalitarian bridges can be created between people and groups in countries without democracy, and diaspora members in countries that are democratic. Expatriates have the money and the internet access that result from their membership in the diaspora, as well as an intimate knowledge of the local conditions in their home country. Indeed, members of the diaspora are so widely dispersed across the globe that the internet might be the only way to truly organize them en masse. It is easy to organize discussions and fundraising online: point and click, point and click.

Digital citizens do not face the traditional political and geographical barriers. "Brain drain" was a colonial term. We are all global citizens. The two megatrends of globalization and the internet mean expatriates can digitally play an active role in the political life of their home countries, also post-democracy, in many cases more actively than if they were still living there.

Article 6: The Boundary Concept

Another problem arises. There are countries like China that seem to be able to control even the internet. How would the demosphere reach activists in countries like China? For these types of countries, we would employ the "boundary concept." According to this concept, we organize from outside the boundary. In addition, local activists organize clandestinely from within the country. If that organizing is fierce enough, and the temperature is raised, ultimately the boundary will melt. And we go in.

The appropriate mix of the open and the clandestine will depend on where a particular non-democracy is on our spectrum. Even people from those countries in the diaspora might prefer to work clandestinely for fear of reprisals against their collaborators inside the boundary. Individuals make their choice as to whether to work openly or in a clandestine fashion. The nature of the online world facilitates clandestine work.

Article 7: Action

What will the actions of the demosphere be? For now, we can only speculate. Certainly, some fundraising will occur, channeling money from the diaspora and the democracies to effective, credible, and accountable grassroots activists on the ground. Online money transfer mechanisms will assist in these activities. The transparency of the network will also make sure there is accountability on money matters. All book keeping will be online. This is key.

The network may also act as an advocate, spreading the news of activist persecution to an international audience. People in the network who might get targeted by the state should feel the entire network knows when something happens to them. This role would be similar to that of Amnesty International, the Human Rights Watch, and the Committee To Protect Bloggers, but focused specifically on democracy activists.

We might also, through blogs, publicly debate opponents of democracy. When direct debates are not possible, we will opt for indirect debates. We challenge whatever public statements might be available. We draw attention to their weak and fraudulent arguments and then we counterargue. As soon as they say something, we respond immediately.

We have to create organizations and umbrella organizations among the diaspora. The right to peaceful assembly is just like the right to free speech, a fundamental human right. People should organize as they see fit. We would not direct how people organize. Rather, we would facilitate their organizational activities.

Article 8: The Goal

Once we have this basic infrastructure in place, we could really change gears. The goal is the establishment of democratic governments throughout the world. In some cases, reform will take years. In other cases, decisive street demonstrations, like in Ukraine in 2004, will lead a country from authoritarianism to a fledgling democracy in one dramatice event.

The message is peace and equality. The message is dignity and pride. You organize to achieve them when you do not have them. The demosphere supports this struggle. From the poorest village to the largest metropolis, the demosphere supports this struggle. From the homeland to the edges of the diaspora, the demosphere supports this struggle. From the activist marching through the dusty street to the blogger thousands of miles away on her laptop, the demosphere supports this struggle. On every continent, in every nation, in every heart that beats for the same dream. This is the demosphere. Join us.

Blogalaxy For Global Democracy

Mary Joyce, Demologue